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AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE DEATH TAXATION
OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS *
By ABRAHAM S. GUTERMAN t
The term "double taxation" has been commonly used to refer to
the imposition of the same type of tax on the same property bymore
than one taxing jurisdiction. It expresses, perhaps with subtlety, the
fond hope that not more than two jurisdictions will assert such right to
tax, and the problem generally does arise with respect to the claims of
two competing jurisdictions. However, one need only refer to one of
the most famous cases dealing with this problem-The Green Estate1
to recognize that the problem is one of multiple taxation in which the
number of states claiming a tax will vary with the peregrinations of an
individual and the geographical distribution of his wealth.
Although many states have enacted various forms of legislation
to alleviate the impact of multiple death taxation, there continue to
be broad areas in which the possibility of such taxation continues in full
force. Within the ambit of these areas, a thorough understanding of
the legal aspects of the problems involved and the practical steps which
a wise foresight may counsel, may help to avoid or at least mitigate the
seriousness of the financial penalties involved.
2
The problem of multiple death taxation arises in two ways.
There may be a claim that a person was domiciled in two or more
states, in which case more than one state claims the right to tax the
decedent's estate generally. It may arise in a more limited way with
* This paper is part of the proceedings of the Fifth Annual Institute of Federal
Taxation of New York University.
t Member of the New York Bar; A. B., 1933, Yeshiva College; LL. B., 1936, Har-
vard University; Lecturer, New York University Institute on Taxation.
i. Texas v. Florida, 3o6 U. S. 398 (1939) discussed infra, p. 702.
2. A complete discussion of the legal aspects of multiple state death taxation will
be found in Guterman, Rei talization of Multiple State Death Taxation, 42 CoL. L.
REV. 1249 (1942).
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respect to the situs of particular property where the decedent's domicile
is not in controversy. Most of the important cases in the U. S. Su-
preme Court on this subject have involved the jurisdiction of a state
to tax particular property where the decedent was concededly domiciled
elsewhere. 3 The presence or absence of jurisdiction to tax has pre-
sented the occasion for decision by the U. S. Supreme Court as to
whether a particular exercise of power contravened the Fourteenth
Amendment. But conflicting determinations by the states as to the
domicile of a decedent have been held not to present a Constitutional
question.4  Thus judicial determination by more than one state that
a decedent was domiciled within its borders will not ordinarily be sub-
ject to review by the Supreme Court.5
Generally speaking a state has jurisdiction to impos.e a death tax
on the property of a non-domiciliary where the property involved has
received protection and benefit from the state of location or where a
transfer of the property depends upon and involves the law of the par-
ticulai state." For all practical purposes this means that all intangible
personal property, located in a state, may be subjected to death tax in
that state. The question of location depends on the nature of the in-
tangible. A debt may be taxed at the debtor's or creditor's domicile
as well as by the state where the physical evidence thereof is located.
The state of incorporation may, tax the transfer of stock by death even
though the decedent was domiciled elsewhere and the certificate of stock
was not within that state.7 However, tangible personal property may
be taxed only in the state of its permanent location even to the exclu-
sion of the right to tax of the domiciliary state," and the same rule
applies to real property. As a practical matter most states either do
not tax intangible property of non-residents or have reciprocal exemp-
tion statutes whereby the same result is accomplished.9 Except for
the administrative burdens relating to obtaining waivers, etc., in non-
domiciliary states, this presents few problems in the ordinary case.
Far more serious is the problem of multiple domicile, where each
state claiming decedent as a domiciliary asserts the right to tax the
3. E. g. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (19o3); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268
U. S. 473 (1925) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930) ;
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930) ; Beidler v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. I
(193o) ; First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932), overruled,
Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
4. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292 (1937).
5. See Guterman, supra note 2 at 1277-8.
6. See Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 444 (1940).
7. Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U. S. 174 (1942).
8. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
q. Thirty-one states have reciprocal exemption of intangibles of non-residents.
Many states do not tax intangibles of non-residents. Some states tax intangibles only
when used in a business in the state. Many states make their exemption inapplicable
to non-residents of the United States.
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entire succession on death. This may result in a crushing burden, as
in The Green Estate where the states of Texas, Florida, New York and
Massachusetts each claimed the decedent as domiciliary, and where
the combined Federal estate tax and death taxes of each of the states
would have wiped out the entire estate; in fact, the estate assets would
have been insufficient to pay all four of the state taxes. This latter
fact was held by the Supreme Court to make the proceeding before
them a controversy between the states over which the Supreme Court
has exclusive and original jurisdiction.10 Except in such a case, the
Supreme Court has refused to review conflicting state determinations
of domicile, and the only relief lies in state cooperation in the interests
of fair play.
A number of states, which have faced this problem frequently,
have enacted statutes authorizing the compromise between claimant
states of the death tax.1 Some of these statutes provide for arbitra-
tion of the dispute if compromise cannot otherwise be effected.' 2  At
times claimant states have been willing to submit to a court of one of
them the final determination of the decedent's domicile. The leading
case of this type is Matter of Trowbridge 13 where Connecticut sub-
mitted its controversy as to domicile to the New York courts and where
the Court of Appeals of New York held that decedent was domiciled
in Connecticut.
1 4
DOMICILE
Domicile refers to the "technically preeminent headquarters that
every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties
that have been attached to it by the law may be determined." '1 A
man's domicile enters into many of fiis rights and obligations other
than the disposition of his property on death. The law recognizes that
a man may have but one. domicile at any one time. But courts may dif-
fer as to where that domicile is to be fixed. The criteria for decision
have been declared to be fact plus intention. If a man intends to make
a particular place his home, he does not thereby become domiciled there.
io. Texas v. Florida, 3o6 U. S. 398 (1939).
ii. The following state statutes have been enacted for the compromise of death
tax claims based on conflicting claims of domicile: DEL. LAWS c. 5 (1941) ; MD. LAWS
cC. 982-3 (1945) ; MASS. AcTs c. 428 (i943) ; N. H. LAws c. 139 (194) ; N. J. LAws
c. 220 (i44) ; N. Y. TAx LAW §249-o; Act of i919 June 20, P. L. 521, art. IV, §43,
added i941, Aug. 5, P. L. 521, § 1, PA. STAT. AN oT. tit. 72, § 2451 (Purdon, Supp.
1946).
12. The statutes of Delaware, Maryland and Massachusetts provide for arbitration.
13. 266 N. Y. 283, 194 N. E. 756 (935).
14. See Matter of Stone, i35 N. Y. Misc. 736, 24o N. Y. Supp, 398 (Surr. Ct.
1929); Matter of Lydig, 19I App. Div. 117, i8o N. Y. Supp. 843 (ist Dep't 1920);
Estate of Benjamin, 176 N. Y. Misc. 518, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 948 (Surr. Ct. 1941), aff'd.,
289 N. Y. 554, 43 N. E. 2d 531 (1942).
i5. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U. S. 61g, 625 (1914).
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He must couple that intention with the fact of actual residence there.
Even the factor of intention has been the subject of progressive modifi-
cation. The more recent cases have indicated that the kind of inten-
tion required to establish a domicile is an intention to make a home
and not an intention to create a domicile.16  A man may declare his
intention to be domiciled in a place in numerous ways, by registering
for voting, by filing tax returns on the basis of domicile, etc. But
unless these public acts and formal declarations are consistent with an
intention to make his home there, he will not be held to be domiciled
there. The final determinant of domicile is the general pattern of his life.
A man's home is the place with which he is more intimately associated
than any other place. The usual factors in deciding this question are,
a dwelling place appropriate to his needs and position, a fair amount
of time spent there, carrying on his principal activities there, his inti-
mates and things close to him kept there, and an intention when away
to return there; in other words, domicile is the place away from which
a man may be said to be wandering.
The question of where a man is domiciled has become increas-
ingly important because of the multiplication of instances of people
maintaining winter and summer residences in different states and
spending substantial amounts of time in both residences. Attempts at
change of domicile are sometimes made consciously. They are fre-
quently motivated by tax considerations. Such attempts often leave
a man dangling between his original domicile around which his life
revolves, and his bwn affirmative statements of one kind or another
that he is-domiciled elsewhere. In most cases, unless he is willing to
really change his home, a formal and publicized change of domicile will
only cause difficulties and expense in the form of litigation and taxes.
A hypothetical case, being a composite of the facts of several of the
leading cases, will illustrate the dangers to be avoided in this type
of situation and the affirmative steps to be taken to forestall pos-
sible difficulties.
Let us suppose that Mr. Smith, a man of wealth, has a home in
New York City and a summer home in Connecticut. Mr. Smith is
now in his sixties, his children are grown up and he has begun to spend
more and more time in his Connecticut home. Both his home in New
York and in Connecticut are substantial and either is of a type that
could be his permanent home. Mr. Smith has collected a consider-
able number of valuable objects of art, paintings, bric-a-brac, and stat-
uary, some of which he keeps in New York and some in Connecticut.
16. See RESTATEMENT, Coim.icr OF LAWS § 19 (1934): "The intention required
for the acquisition of a domicile of choice is an intention to make a home in fact, and
not an intention to acquire a domicile." See also Matter of Trowbridge, 266 N. Y. 283,
291, 194 N. E. 756, 759-60 (1935); Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 165-66, 163 Atl.
303, 308 (1932).
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Since he has lived most of his life in New York, all of Mr. Smith's asso-
ciations, friends and activities are centered in New York. At various
times in years past Mr. Smith has created trusts in favor of his children
which of course have their locus in New York, where the property in
trust and the trusteesare located. Mr. Smith visits his lawyer one
day and inquires as to the relative advantages death-taxwise of New
York and Connecticut.
Now it is an easy thing to obtain a list of a man's assets, charts
of the death tax rates of both states and make an arithmetical computa-
tion. If this procedure is followed and Mr. Smith takes steps to
change his domicile on the basis thereof, it may be a sad day for Mr.
Smith and his estate. For in considering whether Mr. Smith shall
take steps to change his domicile, there are certain vital considerations
that cannot be overlooked. The first and foremost is whether Mr.
Smith in the nature of things is in a position to really change the pat-
tern of his existence and accomplish a change of domicile that will
stick. Mere registration for voting, and change of address on all docu-
ments and other formal indications of change may only create a new
claim of domicile by the Connecticut authorities without shaking off
the claim of the New York authorities. Even though change of domi-
cile is not regarded as complete, so that Mr. Smith's domicile of origin
is still in New York, the claim of domicile in Connecticut may be made
regardless. In other words, if change of domicile is contemplated it
must be capable of being carried out, and be carried out so as to accom-
plish the purpose intended.
The second consideration is to arrive at a clear and accurate deter-
mination of the supposed tax advantages. This demands careful study
of several factors. It may be that certain of the trusts created by Mr.
Smith will be free of death tax in New York but might be taxable in
Connecticut. 1'7 This possibility might not only destroy any tax advan-
tage but might impose a serious tax burden. Furthermore, in any
computation, real property and tangible personalty which will con-
tinue to be located in New York must be considered as taxable by New
York in any event, even if change of domicile is successfully accom-
plished. And vice versa, in computing the New York tax burden
such items of property in Connecticut must be excluded from the New
York computation.
The third consideration is to weigh carefully the impact of taxes
other than death taxes and exactly what burden they would impose
under the particular circumstances. A man with a large portfolio of
bonds or certificates of indebtedness might find some concern in the
17. See the discussion under "Inter vivos Trusts" infra, p. 712.
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Connecticut annual tax on this type of property, and particularly on
the penalty tax on an estate for five years before death if full declaration
and payment of this tax was not made.' The New York State income
tax is imposed on anyone who ipends more than seven months in New
York regardless of where domiciled. 19 The length of time spent in
New York must be carefully measured and a careful record kept if any
advantage is to be preserved. Other states would present analogous
questions of collateral tax advantages and disadvantages.
Having considered carefully all of these factors, Mr. Smith con-
cludes that he will change his domicile from New York to Connecticut.
From that point forward every step should be taken to emphasize the
definitive change of domicile. It is interesting that New York State
in investigating questions of domicile has an extensive check list of
items, some seemingly insignificant, e. g., hospital admission state-
ments, biographical records in Who's Who or similar publications and
corrected proofs in publication offices, obituaries, gun permit appli-
cations, yacht registrations, patent or copyright applications, inter-
ests in other estates and other items listed below.2 0  The kind of items
investigated indicates sufficiently the detail required in making various
formal matters consistent-with the newly chosen domicile. The first
change should be in Mr. Smith's will which should be redrawn so that
the new residence is set forth, and also any limitations or provisions
should be consistent with the laws of the new domicile, e. g., the rule
against perpetuities, exoneration of fiduciaries from liability, the desig-
nation of an out of state corporate fiduciary, etc. A check should be
made as to whether under the new domicile's state law a residuary leg-
atee may exercise powers of appointment unless excepted, and similar
questions. 2' Steps should be taken to be excused from state and federal
jury duty in New York on grounds of non-residence. All home ad-
dresses on all documents should be made to conform to the change.
Mr. Smith should cancel his voting registration in New York and reg-
ister for voting in Connecticut. He could even notify the Town Clerk,
or other appropriate functionary, that he is now a permanent resident
i8. GEN. STAT. OF CONN. §§ 1402-3 (Revision, 1930).
19. N. Y. TAX LAW, § 350, 17.
20. Club applications, church affiliations, social register association records, con-
tributions, voting records, automobile records, federal income tax returns and state
returns, hotel registers, leases, business and residential addresses, insurance company
records, bank and safe deposit company records, prior wills, powers of attorney, etc.,
garage records, County Clerk's office (judgments, lawsuits, corporate records, certifi-
cates of doing business, limited partnerships), deeds, mortgages, social security records,
marriage and birth records, securities address records, newspaper files, telephone, elec-
tric, gas and heat records, schedules of contents in respective premises, friends and
relatives in respective states, year around heating, plumbing and sanitary facilities and
equipment of respective premises, whereabouts of lares and penates such as heirlooms,
photographs, paintings, mementoes, etc.
21. See discussion infra under "Powers of Appointment" at p. 715.
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of the township or city and inquire whether any local laws require or
permit any other action to be taken.
If at all feasible Mr. Smith should sell the old homestead in New
York, and his stays in New York should not be of too long duration.
If the time spent in Connecticut remains the same before and after
the change, even if absence from New York is accomplished by trips
to other places, it will tend to negative a change of domicile.2 2  Since
Connecticut was formerly the summer home, it is important to be in
Connecticut for part of the winter to emphasize the permanence of the
change. In this connection a careful diary of time spent in various
places should be kept as a record. Furthermore, insofar as New York
income tax is concerned, it is important to file a non-resident return,
and, if possible, to have the entire question of change of domicile
determined in Mr. Smith's lifetime for income tax purposes. Although
the income tax determination will not finally settle the ultimate ques-
tion of death tax, it may be very important in the resolution of that
question. Since Mr. Smith has presumably been filing resident New
York income tax returns up to the time of the change, it is quite likely
that an investigation or inquiry will follow his filing of a non-resident
return.
To the extent possible Mr. Smith should keep as much of his prop-
erty as he can in Connecticut. Of course, as between New York and
Connecticut it may not be practical to remove banking and brokerage
accounts. Although New York does not tax the intangible property
of a non-resident, nevertheless, New York or any other State of orig-
inal domicile might be in a better position to assert a claim of domicile
when substantial property is in the state. The question of possible
enforcement of death tax claims in other states is hereinafter dis-
cussed,2 2" but as a practical matter the question of how vigorously a
state may claim domicile of a decedent will in many cases be affected
by what property of the decedent may be reached within the state.
If Mr. Smith's art collection happens to be loaned to a museum,
let us say in Pennsylvania, its permanent location should be clarified.
If tangibles are only temporarily in a state they are still taxable by the
state of domicile. If permanently located in a non-domiciliary state,
that state alone may impose a tax to the exclusion of the state of domi-
cile.23  Although the question of permanent location will be finally de-
22. See Matter of Lydig, 191 App. Div. 117, 121, 18o N. Y. Supp. 843 (Ist Dep't
192o) where the court stated: "There was no change in the mode of life of the dece-
dent. He continued to reside in the house which he owned and in which he had stayed
for years for the same period of time during each year. He spent no more time at
Lenox (Mass.) than he formerly did."
22a. Pp. 710-712 infra.
23. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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termined by the Supreme Court so that there is final review of the ques-
tion, with only one tax imposed,24 nevertheless, that is an expensive
and arduous way of avoiding a double tax. It would be preferable
to have the situation of the paintings clarified so that the question is
avoided.
Upon Mr. Smith's death it is of the utmost importance that a care-
ful study'of the facts be made to determine whether Mr. Smith really
succeeded in changing his original domicile. Do not proceed with
original probate until you are satisfied where Mr. Smith was finally
domiciled. Gather all the facts from members of the family, from all
papers, documents, etc. Do not permit any papers of decedent, how-
ever insignificant, to be thrown out. Once original probate is issued
in one state, it will be difficult to escape a full pledged claim of domicile
by that state. When the original probate is obtained the proceeding
for ancillary probate will probably result in the claim by the tax author-
ities in that state that decedent was domiciled there, and consequently
original probate belonged in that state. It is at this point that steps
should be taken to work out a compromise between the two competing
states.
COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE STATES
The theory upon which a compromise should be approached is that
Mr. Smith's estate should be subjected to the death tax of only one state
and that the purpose of the compromise is to determine the basis of divi-
sion between the two competing states. The very nature of compro-
mise is such that it is entirely possible that the states will be unable to
reach agreement. Some of the compromise statutes make specific
provision for arbitration in such a contingency. 25 New York has a
specific compromise statute in case of conflict as to domicile, with no
provision for arbitration, and Connecticut deals with this type of case
on the basis of the general power under Connecticut statutes of a com-
promise by the State tax authorities upon authorization by the Attor-
ney General of the state.2 6  In such a situation it is essential that the
facts be narshaled in a way to lead to compromise. If the facts are
such that either of the states feels that the other state's claim is not
24. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112 (1934). In that
case one Clarke, a resident of New York, loaned to a museum in Pennsylvania paint-
ings which remained there until his death two years later. Both states claimed the
rights to impose a death tax. The court found the paintings permanently located in
Pennsylvania and was influenced strongly by the absence of a definite intention ever
to return them to New York.
25. See note ii supra.
26. GEN. STAT. OF CONN. § 1391 (Revision, 1930). Cf. Cooley v. South Carolina,
204 S. C. 1o, 28 S. E. 2d 445 (1943) where the Supreme Court of South Carolina held
that it was within the general powers of the Attorney General of the state to compro-
mise a death tax claim with the State of New Jersey.
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substantial, it will insist upon a higher proportion of the total state death
tax paid with the consequence that a stalemate between the states may
result.2 7  Both states would then assert a claim for death taxes on the
basis of being the domiciliary state.
This problem is tied in with the original decision as to where
original probate should be attempted. The state chosen for original
probate would consider itself entitled to the lion's share of the total tax
on the ground that the executors of the estate have indicated as their
opinion that that state was the decedent's last domicile. Despite the
necessity of making the choice as to original probate, a case for com-
promise can usually be made out. The more even the balances on the
respective claims of the states, the greater the possibility of compro-
mise. Generally one or the other of the states will have a higher tax
and the problem then arises as to whether the compromise is to be on
the basis of the lower or the higher of the two taxes. The policy of
the states generally tends toward adjustment between them on the
basis of the higher of the two taxes. The mechanics for effectuating
such a division are as follows: Using Mr. Smith's case as an example
and assuming that the State of New York and the State of Connec-
ticut are to divide up the estate tax equally between them, a compro-
mise agreement will be entered into between the two states through
their respective tax authorities whereby the tax payable to the State
of New York (assuming New York is the place of original probate)
would be determined, and 50% thereof would be payable, and the tax
payable to Connecticut would be determined as if the decedent were a
domiciliary of Connecticut and 50% of that tax would be payable. In
the event that the tax of one or the other of the states is higher in the
particular case, there would be added to the tax paid to each state 50%
of the excess tax which would have been payable if the decedent had
been domiciled in the state having the higher tax.
In determining the basis for the compromise, real property and
tangible personal property permanently located in a particular state,
which would in any event have been taxable only by the state of loca-
tion, will ordinarily be excluded from the scope of the compromise.
On the other hand, the terms of the compromise may be so worked out
that in effect the compromise will cover all of the decedent's property.
In addition, the compromise will likewise afford both states the agreed
participation in any excess that may be payable by the estate for state
estate or inheritance taxes by reason of the 8o% federal credit under
27. The compromise statutes generally empower the state taxing officials to corn-
promise death tax claims only if the tax of other claimant jurisdictions is fixed as part
of the compromise.
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the basic estate tax of the Revenue Act of 1 9 2 6 .27a Generally, the
states provide by law for a catch-all-tax whereby if the particular state
estate tax does not equal the 80% credit, then an additional tax is im-
posed up to the amount of the 8o % credit.
The procedure for compromise is started by the submission to both
state taxing authorities of a statement of facts which may then be the
subject of an inquiry or investigation by each of the states. Custom-
arily a joint hearing will then be arranged before the taxing authorities
of both states for the presentation of points of argument, and the deter-
mination of whether a compromise shall be effected, and the method
of division of the total tax between the states involved. If agreement
is reached, a formal written agreement will then be prepared embody-
ing the basis of division between the states and the undertaking by each
of the states that the tax so divided between them shall constitute the
total tax levied on the particular estate. It may be desirable in New
York State to have the matter taken up with the Surrogate with a view
to his indicating his approval of the reasonableness of the agreement
since the power of fixing of the ultimate estate tax liability in New York
is vested in the Surrogates.
An important question that may run through the entire problem
here under discussion is the value of the property located in or subject
to the control of each state, and the extent to which the liability for tax
asserted by one state can be enforced against property in the other
state. It had formerly been held that the revenue laws and the judg-
ments based thereon of one state would not be given full faith and credit
in another state.28  In other words, a judgment obtained in one state
for taxes could not be enforced in another state in the same way as a
judgment obtained for any other civil liability.29  More recently, the
Supreme Court of the United States held in Milwaukee County v.
M. E. White Co. 30 that a judgment in one state for taxes must be given
full faith and credit if suit is brought thereon in another state. The
question, of course, still remains whether such a judgment was ob-
tained under circumstances constituting due process of law.3 1  For ex-
ample, if a judgment were obtainable in a particular state for taxes upon
a mere notice to the taxpayer without adequate opportunity for a
hearing and a right to defend, such a judgment might be denied full
faith and credit on the ground that it violated the due process clause.
27a. 44 STAT. 9 (1926) ; 26 U. S. C. § 3O (b) (1940).
28. Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921).
29. But see People v. Coe Mfg. *Co., 112 N. J. L. 536, 176 A. 198 (1934), cert.
denied, 293 U. S. 576 (1934).
30. 296 U. S. 268 (1936).
31. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90
(1917) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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The methods of obtaining judgments on tax claims of many states
may be attacked on this ground because of the frequent absence of any
judicial action prior to the actual entry of the judgment.32
In connection with death taxes where competing jurisdictions
claim domicile, this latter feature may affect the applicability of the
Thite case. If New York claims that Mr. Smith is domiciled there
and Connecticut has obtained a judgment under the death tax laws of
Connecticut which it attempts to enforce in New York, the courts of
New York might reopen the question of domicile upon which the
jurisdiction for the Connecticut judgment was based, on the ground
that that question was a jurisdictional fact, the presence or absence of
which would determine the validity of the judgment. It is true that
the Supreme Court of the United States has refused to review con-
flicting determinations of domicile by two or more states on the ground
that such conflicting determinations as such do not constitute a denial
of due process of law.33 However, it does not follow that a state court
might not reopen the question of domicile where a judgment is sought
to be enforced whose validity rests upon the finding of domicile by an-
other state court.
Many of the states have enacted statutes permitting the reciprocal
enforcement of state inheritance taxes.34 Section 249-t (2) of the
New York Tax Law is typical of this type of statute and the text is
noted below. 3 5 It will be seen that it applies when the New York Tax
32. See Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357 (1921) where the New
York court in rejecting the enforcement of a death tax by Colorado emphasized that
under the Colorado statutes the only judgment obtainable was in ren against property
located there, which was not done due to the absence of any property in Colorado.
Even under Milwaukee County v. M. C. White Co., state statutes may not authorize
the kind of judgment entitled to full faith and credit in another state.
33. See note 4 supra.
34. States having such statutes are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Virginia and Washington.
35. § 249-t. (2) "Whenever the tax commission is cited on the issuance of orig-
inal letters testamentary or of administration in the estate of a decedent not domiciled
in this state, as in the preceding subdivision provided, it shall immediately notify the
proper taxing authorities of the state in which such decedent was domiciled of the fact
of the filing of the petition and of the decedent's property and the value thereof, as set
forth in the petition. No executor or administrator of the estate of such a decedent
to whom original letters have been issued pursuant to a petition filed subsequently to
the time this subdivision takes effect shall be entitled to a final accounting or discharge
unless he shall have filed with the surrogate proof that all death taxes, together with
interest or penalties thereon, due to the state of domicile of such decedent, or to any
political subdivision thereof, have been paid or secured, or a consent by the proper tax-
ing authorities of the state of domicile to such final accounting or discharge. It shall
be the duty of the tax commission to co-operate with the domiciliary taxing authorities
and to furnish them with such information as may be requested with respect to any
such estate. The official or body charged with the administration of the death tax
laws of the domiciliary state shall be deemed a party interested in such estate to the
extent that he or it may petition for an accounting therein if the death taxes, interest
and penalties due such domiciliary state, or a political subdivision thereof, are not paid
or secured, and upon such petition the surrogate may decree such accounting and may
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Commission is cited on the issuance of original letters testamentary or
of administration in the estate of a decedent not domiciled in that state.
In which event, the Tax Commission is required to notify the taxing
authorities of the state of domicile, and no executor or administrator of
such an estate to whom original letters have been issued shall be enti-
tled to a final accounting or a discharge unless he shows he has paid
all taxes due to the state of domicile, or obtains consent by the state of
domicile to a final accounting or discharge. The Tax Commission
is enjoined to co-operate with the domiciliary taxing authorities, and
the domiciliary authorities are given a right to come into the New
York courts to require an accounting and payment of the tax. The
law gives this privilege only to those states which give the same priv-
ilege to New York.
But it seems clear from the foregoing that in a case where a state
itself claims the domicile of a decedent, the taxing authorities of another
state would not be accorded the privileges extended by this section.
In other words, this section would apparently have no application
where there is a conflict between states on the question of domicile.
New York State, for example, which by its courts has asserted that a
decedent is domiciled within that state, would obviously not order an
executor or administrator to pay the death taxes of another state based
upon that state's claim of domicile which is in conflict with the New
York claim. For this reason careful consideration should be given
to the value of property within the particular states; and the possibil-
ity of enforcement of the death taxes should not be lost sight of in
working out a compromise.
INTER Vivos TRUSTS
Multiple death taxation affects inter vivos trusts in tWo types of
situations. The first involves the death of the settlor of a trust where
there has been retained such an interest in the trust as brings into play
the death tax statutes of the claimant states. The second involves
decree the remission to a fiduciary appointed by the domiciliary probate court of so
much of the personal property of such estate as may be necessary to insure the pay-
ment to the state of domicile, or political subdivision thereof, of the amount of death
taxes, interest and penalties due to such state or political subdivision. The provisions
of this subdivision shall apply to the estate of a decedent not domiciled in this state
only if the laws of the state of his domicile contain a provision, of any nature or how-
ever expressed, whereby this state is given reasonable assurance of the collection of
its death taxes, interest and penalties, from the estates of decedents dying domiciled
in this state in cases where the estates of such decedents are being administered by the
probate court of such other state by virtue of original letters testamentary or of admin-
istration or if the state in which such decedent was domiciled does not grant letters
testamentary or of administration in estates of nonresidents until after letters have
been issued by the state of domicile. The provisions of this subdivision shall be liber-
ally construed in order to insure that the state of domicile of a decedent shall receive
any death taxes, together with interest and penalties thereon, due to it from such de-
cedent's estate. For the purposes of this subdivision the word 'state' shall be con-
strued to include only the states of the United States, any territory of the United States,
the District of Columbia, and the Dominion of Canada or any province thereof."
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the transmission by death of an interest in trust of one not the settlor
which interest is descendible and passes on death.
In canvassing the possible burden of multiple death taxation, a
study must be made of the anticipated death tax treatment of possible
competing states, of trusts already created. An existing trust which
may have been created on the assumption of freedom from tax in the
then domiciliary state may be found subject to death tax under the law
of the newly acquired domicile. This may destroy all tax advantage
expected from the change of domicile and perhaps impose an increased
tax burden. Assume for example that our friend Mr. Smith created
a trust in New York in 1930 with a life estate reserved. Under New
York law this trust would be free of New York estate tax since it was
created before this type of trust was included within the New York
estate tax law. 36 Upon change of domicile to Connecticut, the same
trust would be subject to Connecticut estate tax since such trusts are
taxable in Connecticut if created after 1915. This result has been
reached in Connecticut even though, at the date of the creation of the
trust, Connecticut had no connection with the trust in any way, and
under New York law which governed, the trust was considered com-
pleted in every respect to come without the scope of the New York
estate tax law.37
Where a settlor creates a trust and reserves some control such as a
power of revocation, amendment, modification or appointment, a
change of domicile after the creation of the trust, but prior to the set-
tlor's death, would simply substitute the new domicile in the position
of the old. Where, however, a life estate has been reserved or some
other interest deemed to be retention of possession or enjoyment until
death, it may be argued that the state of new domicile has no connection
with the trust located in another state, and the old domicile is out of the
picture at the date of death. This type of trust is usually subjected to
estate tax to prevent avoidance of tax on interests which would ordi-
narily pass by death and be subjected to tax. The new domicile had no
standing to assert the right to prevent such avoidance at the date of
the creation of the trust, and it is questionable whether any jurisdiction
to tax may properly be asserted under these conditions. The courts
of New Jersey have refused to impose any tax on these facts,38 while
as indicated above, the Connecticut courts have upheld the right to
tax.39 The Supreme Court of the United States has never directly
passed upon this question.
36. NENW YoRK TAX LAw § 249-V(3).
37. Hackett v. Bankers Trust Co., 122 Conn. 107, 186 AtI. 484 (1936).
38. Maclurkan v. Bugbee, io6 N. 3. L. 192. 15o AtI. 443 (1930).
39. See note 37 supra.
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In Curry v. McCanless,40 the Supreme Court allowed death taxa-
tion by both Alabama and Tennessee when a decedent domiciled in
Tennessee created an inter vivos trust with a trustee in Alabama, and
exercised by will a reserved power of appointment over the trust prop-
erty. In Graves v. Elliott,4 1 the Supreme Court held that New York
could tax the relinquishment at death by a domiciliary of the state, of a
power to revoke a trust of intangibles held by a trustee in another state.
These cases dealt with powers of appointment or revocation which in
effect suspended final disposition of the property subject to some con-
trolling action of the settlor.
Although the scope of jurisdiction to impose death taxes has been
extended to a point where very few constitutional restraints persist, this
question is not entirely free from doubt. The point may be emphasized
in a case involving an alleged transfer in contemplation of death where
even the theoretical continuance of the settlor's interest in the property
until death is completely absent, and the basis of jurisdiction is limited
to a transfer and a state of mind at a point in time to which the state of
the new domicile is entirely unrelated. On the other hand a contempla-
tion of death case may be treated as unique in this particular, while the
reservation of a life estate may be assimilated to the case of a power of
appointment or revocation.
Assuming that the new domicile may tax a trust previously created,
it may be important to remove a trust previously created to a new
domicile to avoid a claim of tax by the state of locus of the trust.
Statutes and tax policy may change, and when a trust is created,
as much flexibility as possible of movement of the trust should be pro-
vided for. It is desirable to insert a clause in the trust instrument
permitting the trustees to remove the trust to any state of their choice,
thereby rendering free the movement of the trust at a time when statu-
tory or other changes might make removal desirable.
42
As pointed out above, multiple death taxation may arise with re-
spect to the ownership by a decedent of a descendible interest in trust
created by someone other than the decedent. Such an interest may be
an estate for the life of another, or for a definite period of years, or a
vested remainder. In the light of the present liberal approach of the
Supreme Court it is likely that the state wherein the trust property is
40. 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
41. 307 U. S. 383 (1939).
42. Statutes expressly permitting removal of trust property to another state with
court permission would appear impliedly to prohibit removal without such consent. See
e. g. ALA. CODE, tit 58, §§ 60-62 (1940); N. J. REv. STAT. tit. 3, c. 24 (937) ; N. C.
CODE ANN. §§ 4O2O-4O22 (Michie, 1939) ; Act of 1917, June 7, P. L. 447 § 58 (g), PA.
STAT. ANNOT. tit. 20, §§ 999-1001, 3174 (Purdon, 1936) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5349, 5351-
5356 (Michie & Sublett, 1936) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4266-4271 (Michie & Sublett,
1936) ; Wrs. STAT. § 231.29 (1939).
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located will be permitted to levy a death tax on such an interest. Prob-
ably the exemption of intangibles of non-residents from death taxation
would exclude such an interest in a trust of intangibles. If the trust
consists of real property or tangible property permanently located in a
state, it would seem that only the state of location of the property may
impose a death tax, even to the exclusion of the state of domicile. The
beneficiary of a trust of real property in another state is, in substance,
no different from an owner of such property as regards its taxation.
However, under the theory that the right of the beneficiary of a trust is
in personam rather than in rem,"43 such right may be treated as an
intangible for purposes of empowering the state of domicile to tax the
interest on death.
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
The state of domicile of a donee of 'a power of appointment over
property held in trust may impose a death tax upon its exercise by
will, although the donor or creator of the power was domiciled in an-
other state where the trust was located. 4  If such a power is exercisable
by deed or will, it may be wise to consider exercising the power by deed
inter vivos to avoid taxability by the donee's state of domicile. Of
course any action with reference to powers of appointment must be
checked against possible federal tax liability. Apart from federal estate
or gift tax liability, the exercise of the power inter vivos will be irrevo-
cable as distinguished from the revocable or ambulatory character of the
exercise of a power by will. Despite these considerations, it may at
times be an important tax saving to exercise such a power by a deed
inter vivos.
Where multiple death tax questions may arise, it is frequently
important to know whether a power of appointment is in fact being
exercised. Most states tax the exercise of a power of appointment.
The non-exercise of a power is generally not taxed.45 Under the law of
a good many states, however, an unconscious exercise of powers of
appointment may result from an unqualified residuary bequest.46  This
is further complicated by the fact that if a residuary bequest were a
proper exercise of a power by the law of the donor's domicile, a valid
43. This view was supported by then Dean (later Chief Justice) Stone. The
Nature of the Rights of the Cestd Que Trust, 17 COL. L. REy. 467 (1917). The more
generally accepted view that the beneficial interest in a trust is a right int rein was
advocated by Professor Scott in The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17
COL. L. REV. 269 (1917).
44. Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U. S. 657 (1942).
45. But see Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 26o (1928), where the taxation of
the non-exercise of a power of appointment was upheld as constitutional.
46. See e. g. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 18.
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appointment would be effected by such bequest even if the law of the
donee's domicile were contrary3 7  Thus, whether a power has been
exercised by a residuary bequest depends upon the law of the donor's
domicile.4 8 The safest method in this situation is to declare specifically
in the donee's will that it is not intended to exercise any powers, thus
indicating the necessary contrary intent needed to negative the presump-
tion of exercise from an unqualified residuary bequest. Check the law
of both the states of domicile of donor and donee before drawing a
donee's will so that there will be compliance with any variations in this
rule that either state may have adopted.
INTERNATIONAL DOUBLE TAXATION
The widespread ownership of foreign securities in the United
States has given rise to serious burdens of double death taxation. In
the field of estate planning, the ownership of assets which may be sub-
jected to foreign death taxes requires careful attention. The first step
is to obtain competent advice not only on the foreign death tax statutes
and their incidence, but also on any foreign law which may vary tax
benefits expected to flow from particular forms of transfer by will or
inter vivos disposition. Where the foreign property is located for pur-
poses of the imposition of foreign death tax will be based on foreign law
which may be founded on theories of tax jurisdiction entirely different
from our own.
More recently international conventions for remedying the double
taxation evil have been in the process of negotiation. The Canadian
Death Tax Convention has already gone into effect and the British
Death Tax Convention has likewise received final approval. 49  These
treaties will, within their scope, eliminate to a great extent double death
taxation with respect to these countries. Treaties with other countries
are in process of negotiation. 50
47. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 73 F. 2d 97o (C. C. A. Ist i934) ; Matter
of Burling, 148 Misc. 835, 266 N. Y. Supp. 482 (Surr. Ct., 1933) ; Matter of New York
Life Ins. & Tr. Co., 209 N. Y. 585, io3 N. E. 315 (1913); Sewall v. Wilmer, 132
Mass. 131 (1882).
48. See RESTATEmENT, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, § 288 (1934).
49. The Canadian Convention was proclaimed by President Roosevelt on March
6, 1945, effective as of June 14, 194L For the text see 3 P-H FED. TAX SERV.
24858-A (I947). The British Convention was proclaimed by Pr6sident Truman on
July 30, 1946, effective as of January 1, I945. For the text see 3 P-H FED. TAX SERv.
24860 (1947). The Tax Convention with France is now awaiting ratification by the
Senate. For text see 5 P-H FED. TAX Stov. 76o8i (1947).
5o. An estate tax convention is in process of negotiation with the Netherlands,
DEPT. OF STATE PREss RELEASE No. 684, Sept. 30, 1946, 5 P-H FED. TAX SERV. 70829
(1946); with Denmark, DEPT. OF STATE PREss RELEASE No. ii, Feb. 1, 1947, 5 P-H
FED. TAX SERv. f170390 (947). Negotiations on an estate tax convention are also
pending with the Philippines. DEPT. OF STATE PREss RELEASE No. 845, Nov. 27, 1945,
5 P-H FED. TAX SERV. 7o791 (1946).
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The Canadian Convention which is now in operation has applica-
tion only to the Dominion Succession Tax but does not apply to the
death taxes of the Provinces of Canada. Holdings of Canadian secu-
rities by American investors total many billions of dollars and Provin-
cial taxes continue to present a double death tax problem necessitating
some understanding of what limitations the Canadian courts have im-
posed on the taxation of American-held Canadian securities. Where a
security in a Canadian corporation can be transferred only at a transfer
office or registry in one of the provinces, that province may impose its
death tax'.5  Where a company has more than one transfer registry,
one of which is located in one of the states of the United States, it has
been recently held that no Canadian Provincial tax can be levied on the
transfer of such a security even where the decedent died domiciled in a
state other than where the transfer registry is located and where the
certificate of stock was located. This is the effect of a series of recent
cases 52 which departed from an earlier viewpoint that such shares have
their situs for taxation in the province where the principal registry
office is located unless the shares were located in the state of the branch
registry office.58 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has
finally settled this question by affirming the principle of the most re-
cent cases.
54
It is important to note that the situs of bearer bonds and securi-
ties under Canadian law is determined by the location of the instru-
ments at death,55 and shares held in a broker's name and endorsed in
blank are considered bearer securities and free of tax unless located in
the Province.56 Thus keeping Canadian secttrities located in the
United States in the name of a nominee, endorsed in blank, would seem
to be a means of avoiding provincial death taxes, since jurisdiction of
the Province to tax would be lacking.
51. Brassard v. Smith, [1925] 1 D. L. R. 528. Cf. Bliss v. Bliss, 221 Mass. 201,
i09 N. E. 148 (I915).
52. The King v. Globe Indemnity Co., [1945] 2 D. L. R. 25; Maxwell v. The
King, [1945] 2 D. L. R. 35; Re Aberdein, [1945] 2 D. L. M 37; Re Blonde, Ct. of
App. for Ont., Can. Succession Duties Rep. 5o4I. The Alerdein and Blonde cases
were affirmed by the judicial Committee of the Privy Council on Oct. io, 1946, Can.
Succession Duties Rep. 1 51o6. Each of these cases dealt with an Ontario company
or one having a head office in Ontario. Under date of April 24, 1946, the Treasurer
of Ontario announced that where there is a registry in the United States, shares in
Canadian companies are not taxable if the owner is a United States resident and the
certificates are in the United States.
53. E. g. Rice v. The King, [19391 4 D. L. R. 701; Ivey v. The King, [19391 1
D. L. R. 631. Cf. Williams v. The King, [1944] 3 D. L. R. 225.
54. See note 52 supra.
55. Winans v. Attorney General, [1910] A. C. 27.
56. Stern v. The Queen, L. R. 1896 Q. B. 211. See Fairbanks, Shares of a Non-
Resident Decedent-A Canadian View, 22 TAx MAG. 103 (1944), to the effect that
the Stern case is generally followed in Canada. The special treatment accorded "street
certificates" is referred to in Re Blonde and Re Aberdein, decided by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council on Oct. 1o, 1946, Can. Succession Duties Rep. 1 Sio6.
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CONCLUSION
The problems of multiple state death taxation may some day be
solved by more effective means than those evolved up to this time by
the governmental authorities involved. Federal intervention has been
proposed by grants-in-aid to states which do not impose death taxes,5
7
or by allowing the 8o% state death tax credit under the Federal Estate
Tax Law only to estates of taxpayers in states imposing death taxes on
intangibles in accordance with Federal stipulations specifying the scope
of such taxation. 58 Expansion of the scope of compromise statutes
and arbitration procedures between the states may help to solve the
double domicile problem.59 Pending some more effective solution, an
alertness to the points outlined in this article may help to overcome
some of the serious burdens of multiple state death taxation.
57. See Hellerstein and Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54
HA v. L. REv. 949, 973-975 (i41). This would in effect mean that the Federal Gov-
ernment would collect higher taxes and share with the states on the basis of factors
such as population, wealth, collections within a state, etc. See also Rodell, A Primer
on Interstate Taxation, 44 YALE L. J. 1166, 118-1185 (1935). Cf. TwENTiETH CEN-
TURY FUND, INC., FACING THE TAXoPROBLEM 371-373 (1937).
58. See Hellerstein and Hennefeld, supra note 51, at 971. See also Oakes, Devel-
opinent of American State Death Taxes, 26 IOWA L. REv. 451, 452 (1940); Note,
Removal of Due Process Prohibitions against Multiple State Taxation of Intangibles,
51 YALE L. J. 1398, 1405 (1942).
59. See notes ii and 12 supra and the discussion under Compromise Between the
States, supra pp. 708 et seq. Other suggestions with respect to intangibles of non-
residents have been flat rates on the intangibles of non-residents (see Brady, Death
Taxes-Flat Rates and Reciprocity, 14 A. B. A. J. 309 (1928)), uniform reciprocal
exemption statutes (see UNIFORM RECIPROCAL TRANSFER TAX ACT, 9 UNIFORM LAws
ANNOTATED 619 (1942)), and credits by the state of domicile for taxes paid to other
states (see former N. Y. TAX LAW § 249-0 which was repealed by N. Y. Laws 1940,
C. 138).
